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Abstract—Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are secu-
rity primitives that exploit the unique manufacturing variations
of an integrated circuit (IC). They are mainly used to generate
secret keys. Ring oscillator (RO) PUFs are among the most
widely researched PUFs. In this work, we claim various RO
PUF constructions to be vulnerable against manipulation of their
public helper data. Partial/full key-recovery is a threat for the
following constructions, in chronological order. (1) Temperature-
aware cooperative RO PUFs, proposed at HOST 2009. (2) The
sequential pairing algorithm, proposed at HOST 2010. (3) Group-
based RO PUFs, proposed at DATE 2013. (4) Or more general,
all entropy distiller constructions proposed at DAC 2013.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the ubiquity of integrated circuits (ICs) in our every-
day lives, cryptographic algorithms have become an important
building block. Hereby, one heavily relies on the ability to store
secret information. Traditionally, binary keys are stored in pro-
grammable on-chip non-volatile memory (NVM): EEPROM
and its successor Flash are the main technologies. However, an
attacker can easily gain physical access to the IC. Hardware
attacks, either invasive or noninvasive, are thus a significant
threat. The NVM approach tends to be vulnerable [5], as the
key is stored permanently in electrical form. Additional cir-
cuitry to protect the key is usually complemented by practical
drawbacks: costly, bulky, battery powered, . . .
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been pro-
posed as a more secure alternative. Silicon PUFs quantify
the unique manufacturing variability of nanoscale structures.
The secret is stored in intrinsic physical features of an IC,
resulting in some remarkable security advantages. First, PUFs
are often assumed to be resistant against invasive attacks. One
can argue that invasion damages the physical structure of an
IC. Second, keys are inherently unique for each manufactured
sample of an IC and there is no need to explicitly program
them. Third, the key is only generated and stored in on-chip
volatile memory (VM) whenever key-dependent operations
have to be performed, as such posing limits on the attacker’s
time frame.
Ring oscillator (RO) PUFs are very popular, inter alia
because they can be implemented on FPGA. We describe their
high-level architecture in section II. Unfortunately, PUF bits
by themselves do not result in reproducible and uniformly
distributed keys, as discussed in section III. Helper data con-
structions are therefore required: we describe several proposals
in sections IV and V, applicable to RO PUFs in particular. We
claim them to be vulnerable against statistical attacks, hereby
manipulating the public helper data. Partial or even full key
recovery might be possible, as discussed in section VI. An
extensive reflection of our findings is given in section VII.
Section VIII concludes the work.
II. RING OSCILLATOR PUFS
RO PUFs quantify the manufacturing variability of iden-
tically laid-out oscillators. Each RO, consisting of an odd
number of inverters, will have a unique frequency f . Fre-
quencies are typically measured by counting rising or falling
edges on a wire connecting two subsequent inverters. Figure
1 shows the PUF architecture as originally proposed in [6].
One can distinguish four components: an array of N ROs,
multiplexers to access individual ROs, counters providing a
frequency measurement and a comparator.
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Fig. 1. RO PUF as originally proposed.
A pairwise frequency comparison (∆f ≶ 0) generates a
single response bit r. There are N(N−1)/2 pairwise compar-
isons, although their response bits are interdependent. Consider
the following minimal example, given three ROs: ROA.f <
ROB .f and ROB .f < ROC .f implicates ROA.f < ROC .f .
The total PUF entropy is only log2(N !) bit as there are N !
ways to sort the frequency values. We hereby assume the ideal
case, with all permutations equally likely.
For convenience, the ring oscillators are typically laid-
out as a two-dimensional array on the IC. Without loss of
generality, we still label each RO with a univariate index
i ∈ [1 N ]. The multiplexer-counter-comparator architecture
might greatly vary. Consider the following two extreme cases,
for example: a dedicated counter per RO and a single counter
accessing all ROs via a giant multiplexer.
III. MOTIVATION FOR HELPER DATA CONSTRUCTIONS
Unfortunately, PUF response bits are not directly usable
as a secret key because of two issues: they are not perfectly
reproducible and non-uniformly distributed. We list the root
causes and provide examples for RO PUFs in particular. Helper
data constructions are required to resolve the former issues.
Hereby, public helper bits are generated during a one-time
post-manufacturing enrollment phase. They are stored in (off-
chip) NVM and assist with every key reconstruction. However:
the secrecy of the response bits should be preserved.
A. Reliability
Noise in CMOS transistors (and interconnect) is the main
responsible for the reliability issue. We consider noise as an
unavoidable random time-dependent phenomenon. Instability
of the environment, mostly defined by the IC supply voltage
and the outside temperature, worsens the problem. Note that
RO frequencies increase with both increasing supply voltage
and decreasing temperature. The larger the nominal frequency
discrepancy |∆f | for a given pairwise comparison, the more
reliable the corresponding response bit.
B. Entropy
PUF response bits are non-uniformly distributed, reducing
the entropy of the key. Bias is a major concern hereby: the
probability of a bit to be ‘1’ (or ‘0’) might not be equal
to 50%. Correlations between the bits are another symptom.
Asymmetries in the PUF lay-out are one potential root cause.
Systematic manufacturing variations, which are spatially cor-
related, form another root cause. As illustrated in figure 2, only
random variations are desired. Furthermore, the occasional
occurrence of ∆f = 0 (counter values are discrete) introduces
bias given that either ‘1’ or ‘0’ has to be returned.
Fig. 2. Example frequency topology of a RO array [4]: f(x, y), for an
IC-aligned xy-plane. The linear trend corresponds with systematic variability.
Only the random surface roughness is desired.
IV. RO PAIR SELECTION
There is a variety of methods to select pairs from a RO
array. Their goal is to output many high-entropy bits, possibly
with an incentive towards reliability. We now discuss four
approaches, in order of increasing complexity.
A. Chain of Neighbors
Pairing neighboring ROs is perhaps the most intuitive
approach. The reduced impact of spatial correlations is the
main advantage [3]. For disjunct pairs, bN/2c independent bits
can be generated. By sharing ROs across pairs, up to N − 1
independent bits can be generated.
B. 1-out-of-k Masking
A 1-out-of-k masking scheme [6] is applied to a fixed
set of RO pairs, such as a chain of neighbors. The pairs are
partitioned into groups, each containing k pairs. During enroll-
ment, the pair which maximizes |∆f | is selected within each
group, favoring reliability as such. The corresponding indices
are saved in public helper NVM. Parameter k represents a
trade-off between reliability and efficiency.
C. Sequential Pairing Algorithm
The sequential pairing algorithm [8] selects up to bN/2c
disjunct pairs. The frequency discrepancy |∆f | of every
selected pair does exceed a given threshold ∆fth. Pairing
information is again stored in public helper NVM. Algorithm
1 provides simplified pseudocode. In the original proposal,
one requires frequency measurements at two environmental
extremes.
Algorithm 1: SEQUENTIAL PAIRING (SIMPLIFIED)
Input: Frequency measurements ROi.f with i ∈ [1 N ]
Frequency discrepancy threshold ∆fth
Output: List of pairs {ROi, ROj}
Sort frequencies in descending order and store indices
as vector pi: ROpi(1).f > ROpi(2).f > . . . > ROpi(N).f
i← 1
for j ← dN2 e+ 1 to N do
if ROpi(i).f −ROpi(j).f > ∆fth then
Create pair {ROpi(i), ROpi(j)}
i← i+ 1
D. Temperature-aware Cooperative
Temperature-aware cooperative RO PUFs [7] operate
within a user-defined temperature range: T ∈ [Tmin, Tmax].
An on-chip temperature sensor is assumed to be available,
posing limits on the applicability. Furthermore, RO frequencies
are assumed to be linearly dependent on the temperature.
Neighboring ROs are paired, without overlap, leading to
a total of bN/2c pairs. A frequency discrepancy threshold
∆fth is employed to assess their reliability. Pairs are classified
in three groups, as illustrated on figure 3. Good pairs obey
|∆f(T )| > ∆fth within the whole operating range: they
generate one reliable bit each. Bad pairs obey |∆f(T )| ≤ ∆fth
within the whole operating range: they are discarded. Some
pairs are stable except for an interval [Tl, Th] around their
crossover point: they cooperate to generate reliable bits, as-
sisted by public helper data.
For every cooperating pair, one does store the values of Tl
and Th in public helper NVM. Outside the crossover interval,
no help is required. Although one has to compensate for the
crossover: the response bit is inverted if T > Th. Within the
crossover interval, one does rely on another cooperating pair
with a nonintersecting crossover region. Its index is stored in
public helper NVM as well.
Pairs cooperate in a masked manner, to prevent leakage of
their response bits. Consider a first cooperating pair, requesting
help and having response bit rc1. A masking response bit rg1,
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Fig. 3. Temperature-aware cooperative RO PUF: classification of RO pairs.
The outer dashed lines represent the operating range: [Tmin, Tmax].
originating from a corresponding good pair, is assigned. A
second cooperating pair, providing help and having response
bit rci, should satisfy the following constraint: rc1⊕rg1 = rci.
Note that rg1 and rci are both stable within the crossover in-
terval of the first cooperating pair, allowing for reconstruction.
However, we claim that the proposed masking scheme is
not necessarily free from leakage. The second cooperating
pair should be selected at random and hence not with a
deterministic procedure that iterates over all candidates until
the masking constraint is met. Otherwise, one exposes the fol-
lowing information for all non-selected candidates: rcj 6= rci.
V. GROUP-BASED RO PUF
Group-based RO PUFs have first been introduced at HOST
2010 [8]. As the initial design had several shortcomings, the
authors redefined their construction at DATE 2013 [9]. For
ease of understanding, we make abstraction of the gradual
development. In traditional designs, ROs are paired to generate
a response bit. The group-based approach is very different in
this regard. ROs are partitioned into groups, with their size not
limited to two anymore.
The so-called entropy distiller, the main novelty, has been
introduced in parallel at DAC 2013 too [10], although with
more experimental evidence. Its use is not limited to the group-
based approach. Employment with the pair selection methods
of section IV is a possibility as well. We will consider both
use cases for our attacks.
The high-level architecture is represented by figure 4. We
explicitly indicate the IC boundaries and interfaces to clarify
an attacker’s point of view. Like this, we also stress that all
building blocks do require an on-chip implementation. The
resulting key is stored in on-chip VM, for as long as needed.
An application with key-dependent operations communicates
with the user, either directly or indirectly. We now discuss the
building blocks separately.
A. Entropy Distiller
The entropy distiller eliminates systematic manufacturing
variations. They are modeled via polynomial regression on
the two-dimensional RO frequency map f(x, y). The residuals
represent the desired random variations. An expression for the
polynomial of degree p is given below. Experiments in [10]
indicate p = 2 and p = 3 as good values, given an array of
16 × 32 ROs. Coefficients βi,j may be determined in a least
mean squares manner. They are stored as public helper data. A
subtraction procedure removes systematic variations for every
regeneration of the key.
f(x, y) =
p∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
βi,jx
i−jyj .
B. Grouping Algorithm
The grouping algorithm partitions the ROs into groups
G1, G2, . . . The partitioning is strict: every RO is assigned
to exactly one group. Within a group, every possible pair of
ROs does exceed a frequency discrepancy threshold ∆fth,
favoring reliability. Response bits will be extracted for each
group independently. Algorithm 2 provides pseudocode for
the grouping procedure. It optimizes the available entropy of∑
j log2(|Gj |!) bits: having few large groups is more beneficial
than having many small groups.
Algorithm 2: GROUPING
Input: Frequency measurements ROi.f with i ∈ [1 N ]
Frequency discrepancy threshold ∆fth
Output: Group assignments ROi.group
Sort frequencies in descending order and store indices
as vector pi: ROpi(1).f > ROpi(2).f > . . . > ROpi(N).f
RO0.f ←∞
for i← 1 to N do
last(i)← 0
for i← 1 to N do
j ← 1
while ROlast(j).f −ROpi(i).f ≤ ∆fth do
j ← j + 1
ROpi(i).group← j
last(j)← pi(i)
C. Kendall Coding
For every group Gj , there will be a particular order of the
RO frequencies. A binary representation is required. Table I
illustrates two schemes, assuming there are four ROs (A, B, C
and D) in the group and hence 4! = 24 possible orders. The
most compact representations do require dlog2(|Gj |!)e bit, as
illustrated for the second column.
Order Compact Kendall Order Compact Kendall
ABCD 00000 000000 CABD 01100 010100
ABDC 00001 000001 CADB 01101 010110
ACBD 00010 000100 CBAD 01110 110100
ACDB 00011 000110 CBDA 01111 111100
ADBC 00100 000011 CDAB 10000 011110
ADCB 00101 000111 CDBA 10001 111110
BACD 00110 100000 DABC 10010 001011
BADC 00111 100001 DACB 10011 001111
BCAD 01000 110000 DBAC 10100 101011
BCDA 01001 111000 DBCA 10101 111011
BDAC 01010 101001 DCAB 10110 011111
BDCA 01011 111001 DCBA 10111 111111
TABLE I. CODING OF OSCILLATOR FREQUENCY ORDER.
However, to facilitate the subsequent error-correction step,
a non-minimum length coding scheme is proposed. One ob-
serves that errors mostly occur in form of a flip, e.g. BACD to
BCAD. Using Kendall coding, one bit is generated for every
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Fig. 4. Group-based RO PUF.
possible pair of ROs, requiring |Gj |(|Gj | − 1)/2 bits in total.
Error-correction requirements are relaxed in terms of error rate,
as there is only one error per flip. Unfortunately, the workload
increases quadratically with the group size |Gj |.
D. Error-Correcting Code
Incoming bits are clustered in blocks, which are all error-
corrected independently. An error-correcting code (ECC) con-
struction, able to correct t errors per block, is employed hereby.
The first generated instance of each block is considered as a
reference. Public helper data allows regenerated instances to
be error-corrected, so that they are identical to the reference.
E. Entropy Packing
Kendall coding is noted to be non-uniform: many bit
vectors are never used. To maintain entropy, conversion to a
compact coding scheme (as in table I) is proposed. However,
please note that the problem is only fixed partially, since |Gj |!
is not a power of two, given |Gj | > 2.
VI. ATTACKS VIA HELPER DATA MANIPULATION
Before discussing the specifics for each RO PUF construc-
tion, we first describe the common statistical framework of our
attacks. PUF response bits are considered one by one (or in
small groups). For each iteration, two or more hypotheses Hi
provide a statement about the bits of concern, of which exactly
one is correct. Every hypothesis corresponds with a specific
manipulation of the public helper data. We exploit differences
in key regeneration failure rate to assess their correctness.
The attacks on constructions (1) and (2) are generally
applicable. Furthermore, we make no assumption about the
application: an inability to reconstruct the key should affect
the observable behavior of any useful application. The at-
tacks on constructions (3) and (4) are case-specific, so we
limit ourselves to an illustration. Furthermore, they rely on
maliciously reprogrammed keys, assuming their reconstruction
failures to be observable. However, this assumption is often
(if not mostly) satisfied in practice: consider for instance all
applications where some form of encrypted data is presented
to the user.
For generality, we assume all constructions to employ an
ECC as a final reliability measure, which is actually a common
practice. The absence of an ECC can be considered as the
degenerate case t = 0. For ease of explanation, we assume
all bits to fit within a single ECC block. However, extension
to multiple blocks is fairly straightforward. The probability
density function (PDF) of the numbers of errors (at the ECC
input) is particularly useful to quantify failure behavior. A
binomial distribution might provide an accurate model for large
blocks, although our attacks do not depend on this assumption.
Figure 5 provides an illustration, in case of two hypothe-
ses H0 and H1. The nominal PDF serves as a reference:
failures rarely occur in practice, assuming well-chosen ECC
parameters. PDFs corresponding to helper data hypotheses
are slightly shifted with respect to each other and hence
distinguishable. The common offset originates from additional
errors, intentionally and symmetrically introduced to accelerate
the attack.
t # errors
FailurePD
F
nominal H0 H1
Fig. 5. Distinguishing hypotheses by observing key generation failure rates.
A. RO PUF with Sequential Pairing
Key recovery is fairly straightforward for the sequential
pairing algorithm. Consider two RO pairs, resulting in re-
sponse bits r1 and r2. We formulate two hypotheses as shown
below. To distinguish them, we swap the order of the two
pairs in public helper NVM. If H0 is correct, the failure
rate is not modified. However, if H1 is correct, the failure
rate does increase. Matching r1 with all other response bits
r2, r3, . . . rbN/2c, only two possible values remain for the
secret key. For the final decision, the performance of two
corresponding sets of ECC helper data can be compared.
H0 : r1 = r2. H1 : r1 6= r2.
To accelerate the attack, more errors can be injected. For
instance by swapping additional pairs, accordingly for the
helper data of H0 and H1. Initially, the additional pairs can be
chosen at random. After revealing some response bit relations
however, one can select these pairs which will introduce a pair
of erroneous bits for sure.
B. Temperature-aware cooperative RO PUF
An attacker can retrieve the response bit relations for
all cooperating pairs of a temperature-aware cooperative RO
PUF. Consider a first cooperating pair, having response bit
rc1 and requesting assistance. A second cooperating pair,
having response bit rci, provides assistance. Consider another
cooperating pair, having response bit rcj . We formulate two
hypotheses as shown below. Helper data is modified so that
rcj provides assistance, assuming reliability for the given
temperature. If H0 is correct, the failure rate is not modified.
However, if H1 is correct, the failure rate does increase. To
accelerate the attack, more errors can be injected. For instance,
via manipulation of the interval boundaries Tl and Th.
H0 : rci = rcj . H1 : rci 6= rcj .
C. Group-based RO PUF
An attacker can retrieve the full key for group-based RO
PUFs, due to the ability to directly reprogram the key. By
injecting steep polynomials into the entropy distiller, one can
completely overshadow random frequency variations. The at-
tacker’s intended pattern can be superimposed onto the original
spatial correlation map hereby. Via repartitioning of the groups,
one can force bits to be either ‘1’ or ‘0’. Also the remaining
helper bits, which represent the ECC redundancy, are updated
accordingly.
Consider the example of figure 6a, given an array of
4 × 10 ROs. The attacker injects strong gradients in the
horizontal direction via a quadratic surface, as represented by
the grayscale. We repartition the groups so that they all contain
two ROs. The responses of G2 to G20 are fully determined by
the attacker. The response of G1 however, is fully determined
by random frequency variations. Note that one could employ
a tilted plane as well, if G1 would cover a single column only.
Suppose the ROs of G1 to belong to the same group for
the original partitioning too. Then their frequency order is
of direct interest, as their corresponding response bit r1 does
influence a subkey. Consider the two hypotheses shown below.
We compute a set of ECC helper data for both cases. The
failure rate is expected to be lower for the correct hypothesis.
Injecting additional errors is straightforward: we just compute
the ECC redundancy given some inverted bit values.
H0 : r1 = 0. H1 : r1 = 1.
D. Entropy Distiller with RO Pairing
Entropy distillers can be employed with all RO pairing
schemes of section IV. We limit ourselves to the first two
schemes, as there is a stand-alone attack for the latter two
schemes. The attack methodology is similar as before. Figure
6b provides an illustration for 1-out-of-k masking, using k = 5
and applied to a non-overlapping chain of neighbors. Figure 6c
provide an illustration for an overlapping chain of neighbors.
It might be very difficult to isolate a single response bit, as
illustrated for figure 6c: four response bits are fully determined
by random variations. By increasing the number of hypotheses
(24), one can still perform the attack however.
VII. DISCUSSION
Former helper data constructions have all been proposed to
solve reliability and entropy issues, as discussed in section III.
However, a well-established standard solution is available as
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Fig. 6. Attacking entropy distiller constructions. The extremum of the
quadratic patterns is marked with a triangle symbol. (a) Group based RO
PUF. (b) 1-out-of-k masking. (c) neighbor pairing.
well: the so-called fuzzy extractor [2]. We briefly discuss its
architecture. Afterwards, we argue why helper data should be
considered as public always, implicating that an attacker has
both read and write access. Finally, we formulate best practices
for both the users and developers of helper data schemes.
A. Fuzzy Extractor
Fuzzy extractors can be used with any PUF architecture:
their use is not limited to RO PUFs. Their definition is very
generic, but typical implementations always rely on an ECC
and a cryptographic hash function, as shown in figure 7. Latter
constructions deal with reliability and entropy respectively, in
a sequential manner.
RO
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NVM
Public Helper Data
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Fig. 7. RO PUF with fuzzy extractor.
B. Helper Data Considerations
In principle, programmable helper NVM can be imple-
mented off-chip as well as on-chip. Therefore, we have drawn
it on the IC boundary in figures 4 and 7. In the off-chip case,
an attacker has full control: reading and modifying data is
straightforward via the interface. However, also in the on-
chip case, memory contents should be considered as public.
Remember that PUFs have been proposed as a more secure
alternative for on-chip NVM. Labelling on-chip helper NVM
as private would undermine the need for PUFs. A motivated
attacker, able to afford expensive equipment, can still obtain
read/write access.
Furthermore, off-chip helper NVM is highly preferable
because of three reasons. First, the overall efficiency might
decrease in the opposite case: on-chip NVM remains while
the PUF and its post-processing logic are extra. Second, on-
chip NVM is expensive, as the standard CMOS manufacturing
flow is insufficient. Third, typical FPGA platforms, for which
RO PUFs are particularly interesting, do not contain on-chip
NVM.
Secure and competitive PUF solutions do not pose read or
write constraints on their helper data. For the fuzzy extractor,
solid theory has been developed. The ECC constructions of [2]
result in a rather limited entropy loss, which is compensated by
the hash function, in addition to the initial non-uniformity. An
extension of the architecture to counter manipulation attacks
is described in [1]. The RO PUF constructions under attack
[7]–[10] do consider leakage as a threat. Manipulation is never
mentioned however, although their prototypes are all developed
on FPGA platforms without on-chip NVM (Xilinx Spartan-3
and Xilinx XC4010XL).
C. Best Practices
We encourage the use of fuzzy extractors, as solid helper
data theory has been developed. Newly proposed schemes
should be compared to this common reference. If efficiency
(area, speed, power/energy, memory) and/or security (quality
of the key, helper data leakage and manipulation, side-channels
etc.) is not expected to improve, there is little argumentation
to promote their use.
However, a thorough comparison is generally lacking: we
strive for better practices in this regard. Sometimes the fuzzy
extractor’s existence is not even mentioned, as for the group-
based RO PUF and the entropy distiller proposal for instance.
Note that the former construction actually borrows its ECC
notion. We question the hardware efficiency of many proposals.
Consider the collective overhead of group-based RO PUFs for
instance. Or consider temperature-aware cooperative RO PUFs,
having applicability issues. Besides a temperature sensor, one
does require an extension of the IC manufacturing flow (see
[7]: measuring RO frequencies, disconnecting bad RO pairs
from power supply, etc.).
Furthermore, many proposals are rather vague about their
use of helper data. The precise storage format, parsing proce-
dure and/or sanity checks are typically not specified. Although
subtle differences might impact security tremendously. We
provide a few examples and strive again for better practices.
For the sequential pairing algorithm, pairs of RO indices are
stored. However, there is no recommendation to store a pair’s
indices in an either randomized or sorted order. Otherwise
there is direct leakage of the full key. The re-use of ROs
across pairs should also be prohibited somehow. For group-
based PUFs, it is not clear whether grouping helper data is
transferred three times or only once, with the former case
offering more opportunities for an attacker.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
Like any other PUF, RO PUFs do require helper data
constructions in order to generate reproducible and uniformly
distributed keys. However, we showed various constructions to
be vulnerable against manipulation of their public helper data.
By observing system failure rates, an attacker can retrieve the
key, or at least obtain some information about it. Actually,
many more helper data constructions have been proposed in
literature, not necessarily limited to the RO PUF. We do
not claim to have studied them all and we advise to use
them with great care. Instead, we encourage the use of fuzzy
extractors, the well-established reference solution. We strive
for better practices when proposing new helper data schemes.
The following two items should be present: (1) an all-inclusive
comparison with the reference solution and (2) a very precise
specification of its helper data use.
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